Histories of Power’ and the ‘Universalisation of Capital’ in India: Between and Beyond Marxism and Postcolonial Theory by Sinha, Subir
 This is an accepted version of the below article which will appear in published form 
in Critical Sociology published by Sage at: http://crs.sagepub.com/  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22124/  
 
‘Histories of Power’, the ‘Universalisation of Capital’, and India’s Modi 
Moment: Between and Beyond Marxism and Postcolonial Theory. 
(forthcoming in Critical Sociology) 
 
Subir Sinha 
School of Oriental and African Studies, UK 
 
Abstract 
Capitalist development in India, and the politics of those who are its immediate 
victims, defies the main varieties of postcolonial theory and Marxism that are today in 
contentious debate, in which postcolonial theory is identified with culture and 
particularity, and Marxism with political economy and universalism. Rejecting this 
framing, I draw attention to recently translated works by Marx, debates in agrarian 
political economy, and writings that emphasize the temporal specificity of 
contemporary capitalist development in India. I show the „compulsion‟ of  capitalists 
to compete and workers to sell their labour and is held back by the on-going politics 
of hegemony: capitalists want state protection and support for accumulation, and 
democracy and rights provide the poor with limited but sometimes effective political 
power. As a result, the primitive accumulation process remains indefinitely 
incomplete, and mature capitalism, defined by some Marxists as „universal‟, is held in 
a sustained state of deferral. 
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Introduction 
 
Postcolonial theory‟s rift with Marxism is not new. For the Indian context, 
Chakrabarty (2009) notes, it dates back to the conditions of the 1970s, when, 
stimulated by the rise of Maoism as a radical critique of both the postcolonial 
nationalist project and of party communism, scholars like him, following Mao, sought 
to replace the primacy of the „economic‟ with that of „the political‟. This resulted in 
the founding of the subaltern school approach, and its successor postcolonial 
approaches (I refer to them, admittedly awkwardly, as the „(post)subalternist‟ or PS 
approaches in this paper). Maoism‟s traces into the PS approaches are unfortunately 
unexplored.
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 What is clear is that these approaches that had started as an internal 
critique of hegemonic „Marxism‟, increasingly positioned themselves outside of 
Marxism in general, and took positions hostile to it. With a few exceptions, the pre-
occupations and categories of Marxian political economy such as land, labour and 
capital, class and state, prominent in early subalternist writings, lost salience as 
grounds on which to explore radical political subjectivity, and were replaced by 
alterity and difference from „modernity‟, expressed in „culturalist‟ terms. India, the PS 
approach argued, had a different kind of capitalism, and a different „history of power‟ 
(that is, different development of bourgeois and working class politics), than Europe, 
so much so that new analytical categories were needed to understand them. Today the 
claims of impasse and incommensurability between Marxism and PS approaches have 
 been accentuated by a vituperative tone. Both sides accuse each other of fundamental 
misreadings of history and Marxist political economy, or, alternatively, of being 
complicit in Eurocentrism and colonial-imperialist violence. 
 
Rather than attempt to reconcile the „culturalism‟ of the PS approaches with the 
„political economy‟ of the Marxists, I assess their accounts of the particularity of 
postcoloniality and the universality of capitalist modernity, and, relatedly, of 
emergent forms of political subjectivity. Drawing on the debates on „postcolonial 
capitalism‟ in India,  a term that combines the supposedly particular with the 
putatively universal, I raise the following questions. Is capitalism in India today 
sufficiently different from capitalism‟s „original‟ location and form as to warrant the 
qualifier „postcolonial‟? Is the difference primarily „cultural‟ and, if so, how does 
„culture‟ produce this difference? Or is the difference „political‟, in the sense that the 
constitution of the political terrain in India makes the development of capitalism – its 
universalization - sufficiently different than in its original location?  Those identifying 
with the PS position answer these questions with a qualified „yes‟, while „Marxists‟ 
hold that capitalism‟s essential dynamics, namely the compulsions of capitalists to 
compete and of workers to sell their labour, are universal. For the former, capitalism 
cannot be replicated in the postcolony. For the latter, the encompassment of all social 
relations in the expanded reproduction of capital no longer leave an „outside‟ to 
capitalism: the universalization of capital is „complete‟, rendering the „postcolonial‟ 
qualifier meaningless. Therein lies the impasse.  
 
Neither position explains the politics of the unfolding of capitalism‟s „essential 
features‟ in India satisfactorily, I argue. To explain how and why Indian capitalism 
 today is different than the capitalism of the original trajectories, I draw on some 
recently translated works of Marx, and engage with the new literature on „the agrarian 
questions‟ and „the agrarian transition‟, and writings on „postcolonial‟ and 
„compressed‟ capitalism in India. Instead of taking „specificity‟ and „universalism‟ as 
settled categories I show how class and other forms of struggles, including over 
„leadership‟ and „cultural‟ meaning, produce contingent and unstable formations, a 
liminal state between completed transition to capitalism of the „original‟ varieties, and 
a complete alterity in relation to it.  
 
The Specific and the Universal 
 
In the inaugural essay of the subaltern studies project, Guha (1982) makes a 
distinction between elite and subalterns in the historiography of colonial India and of 
Indian nationalism, in which the elite were the protagonists of the movement from 
colonial subjugation to freedom, and the people were „followers‟. Such 
historiography, Guha argued, could not understand the actions taken by “people on 
their own, that is, independently of the elite” outside and in defiance of elite control. 
(1982: 3; original emphasis) The project was to provide an account of an „autonomous 
domain‟ of „politics of the people‟, Guha‟s subalterns, constituted in his original 
conceptualisation by class categories: workers and peasants, the urban poor and the 
lower sections of the petty bourgeoisie (Guha, 1982: 5). While interested primarily in 
the subaltern domain, Guha noted its interactions with the elite domain, led by 
progressive elements of the indigenous bourgeoisie.  
 
 The move away from this original moment, redolent of Gramsci-inspired „history 
from below‟, to a preoccupation with colonial discourse and with cultural autonomy, 
is well documented in the literature on the „linguistic‟, „cultural‟ and „Saidian‟ turns 
in subaltern studies, as briefly charted in the Introduction. The cross-pollination 
between subaltern studies and poststructuralist and postmodern critiques of 
metanarratives, enabled by the move to the United States by several key members of 
the collective, enabled subaltern studies to emerge as a prominent branch of 
„postcolonial‟ theory. The elite-subaltern split in Guha‟s inaugural essay was now 
transposed over a world space, leading to the central set of claims of PS scholarship 
that the history of the postcolonies has been different and autonomous from the 
history of Europe, that methods and categories of analysis (Marxism and class, for 
example) emerging from Europe‟s internal history were inadequate and misleading to 
analyse these contexts, and that attempts to shoehorn the history of the colonized into 
these categories constituted epistemic violence.  
 
PS scholars‟ interest in inassimilable difference, ultimate alterity, and irreducible 
autonomy of Indian postcoloniality and of Indian subalterns from the universalism of 
capitalist modernity led them to amend and reject categories emanating from Europe‟s 
Enlightenment, and to substitute them with sui generis ones. Chakrabarty (2002, 
2006) suggests that culture in countries such as India is different enough from the 
original location of capitalist modernity as to pose a key barrier to capitalism‟s 
universalization, and of its attendant analytical and political categories. History 2, the 
history of the lifeworlds of the colonized, retains sufficient autonomy from History 1, 
the history of capital. In a later essay on the possibility of „postcolonial political 
economy‟, Chakrabarty (2009) argues that the life experiences of the ex-colonized 
 exceed categories such as „culture‟ and „economy‟ that were historically created in 
societies that made early transitions to capitalist modernity, and as such cannot 
capture the meanings associated with them by subalterns in places like India. 
 
Chatterjee‟s 1998 essay “Five Hundred Years of Fear and Love” also outlines a 
domain of politics, and forms of political organization and expression autonomous of 
„Europe‟. He traces the lineages of today‟s civil/political society divide, and the 
earlier elite-subaltern one, in the bifurcated encounter with colonial rule: most of the 
elites came to „love‟ Europe and attempted to create mimetic versions of it, and the 
rest never had any knowledge of or positive experiences with colonizing Europe, and 
so were able to retain both an autonomy and a resentment in relation to it.  
 
These works aim to create an „Indian historiography‟ of India (Guha, 2002), based on 
the recovery of a past from narratives tied to conquest and colonization. They typify 
the turn to culture, indigeneity and alterity in the form of „Indian particularity‟. For 
Chakrabarty claims to universalism trace back to the Enlightenment which was itself 
particular to Europe and thus irretrievably Eurocentric. As importantly, the diffusion 
of universalist thinking was inextricable from imperialism with all its attendant 
brutality. For him Marxism cannot be separated from this history (Chakrabarty, 2002: 
32). Marxists such as Ahmad and Sarkar have objected that far from being „radical‟, 
this rejection of the Enlightenment in its entirety leads PS scholars to politically 
reactionary positions. Neither charge is without justification. Marxists like Chibber 
unproblematically use Robert Brenner‟s resolutely Eurocentric account of 
capitalism‟s origins, which they claim is based on „universal‟ principles, to 
understand India today, and posit „workers‟ as a vanguard to new social relations in 
 that European mould. On the other side, if, as Chakrabarty (2002: 32) says, siding 
with Enlightenment rationality implies complicity with the colonial and imperialist 
violence associated with its attempted universalization, then the political implications 
of creating an „Indian‟ knowledge must also be made explicit, especially in light of 
the violence attending the Hindutva right wing‟s on-going projects to this end.  
 
While Chakrabarty (2009) dismisses the possibility of „rightwing‟ postcolonial 
theory, today Hindu nationalist authors harness the works of subaltern historians, and 
of foundational figures of postcolonial scholarship, to their call for an indigenous 
historiographical and analytical tradition drawn exclusively from Indian sources, and 
for rejecting „western‟ modernity‟s key tenets such as science and reason, history and 
the social sciences, secularism and political equality, and class and caste, with huge 
implications for subalterns.
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 Chakrabarty (2012) suggests an equivalence between the 
Hindu neo-fascist Sri Ram Sene whose activists attack women they deem as behaving 
outside the bounds of Hindu civility, and Indian feminists involved in the „pink 
chaddi‟ campaign in which they sent pink underwear to the chief of the Sene. Two ex-
members of the subaltern collective now are prominent spokespersons for the Hindu 
nationalist ruling party in India, the BJP. Insisting on particularity too, not only on the 
universalism of European modernity, creates troubling political choices. 
 
Another Marxist criticism of PS‟s rejection of the universalism of capitalist modernity 
is that they misunderstand capitalism, European history, universalism itself, and 
Marxism as an analytic approach.  While they conceptualise Indian difference against 
the norm of „Europe‟, Chibber (2013) argues that to accept the view that the European 
bourgeoisie was the harbinger of liberal democracy (in comparison to whom the 
 Indian bourgeoisie „failed‟ in its „historical mission‟) is to accept its self-mythology: 
it was in fact rapacious in utilizing force and coercion to squeeze value from labour. 
However, it is not only PS scholars who believe in the progressive nature of bourgeois 
revolutions in Europe, including their positive role in relation to working class 
interests: as the recent debates around Domenico Losurdo‟s Liberalism: A Counter-
history (2011) and critical responses by Pam Nogales and Ross Wolfe (2012) and 
Wolfe (2015) show, that sentiment is present in the writings of Marx, Engels and 
Lenin themselves. This has implications for subaltern subjectivity beyond PS and 
Marxist explanations, as I show below. 
 
For Chibber (2013) PS scholars mistake Marxist claims of capitalism‟s universalism 
as implying homogeneity. Capitalism does not need to flatten cultural differences, and 
indeed, it both creates and utilizes them. What is universal, says Chibber, are two 
„essential elements‟ of capitalism: the „universalisation of a particular strategy‟ 
emanating from the compulsion of capitalists to compete with each other, and the 
compulsion of workers to sell their labour power. It is disingenuous of Chibber to 
present this resolutely Eurocentric Brennerian account as if it has won the day in the 
debate on the origins and universalization of capitalism, when it has been subject to 
trenchant criticism (e.g. Blaut, 1994;  Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). To specify 
capitalism‟s universal principles cries out for an account of the process of 
universalization, which Chibber does not provide.
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Part of Marxist hostility towards the PS approach is its elevation as the authoritative 
framework for producing knowledge about india in the American academy, at the cost 
of Marxism as an analytical lens (Chibber, 2006). As Sinha (2009) has shown, there 
 are good reasons for the decline of certain types of Marxism, chiefly that the politics 
of workers and peasants and the petty bourgeoisie had turned against India‟s party 
communism, from whom they were alienated and to which they had, at times, turned 
antagonistic (though admittedly those parties have now regained some lost ground). 
The rejection of caste as an organizational category, or the tendency to subsume it 
under „class‟ (as in Chibber‟s 2016 interview with Srinivasan), makes Marxism 
irrelevant to, and appear patronizing in relation to, on-going struggles of subalterns. 
Forms of Marxism still influential in the academy, such as Warrenism, promoting 
accelerated capitalist development, whatever its political ecological and social costs, 
dovetail with projects of accelerated growth such as Modi‟s “Make in India” agenda. 
Also the kind of Marxism advanced against the PS approaches itself seems amnesiac 
with regard to Marxism‟s internal critique since the 1970s, notably of its economism 
and essentialism.  
 
Portraying postcolonial theory as culturalist, labeling its understanding of capitalism 
and European history as erroneous, and its political implications as conservative (even 
revanchist) might be defensible, but as argued above, these charges (except 
substituting „economism‟ for „culturalism‟) can also be laid at the door of certain 
kinds of Marxism. It also occludes arguments by Marxists who take PS approaches 
seriously, and by PS scholars who derive their position on postcolonial difference via 
an intimate engagement with Marxist political economy. Recent translations of 
Marx‟s own writings, and Marxist writings on the different context of capitalist 
development today, provide fertile grounds to explore how capitalism in places such 
as India differs from its original location, and the implications this has for its 
universalization.  
  
 
 
How the conditions of capitalist development differ in places such as India  
 
As noted, early subaltern studies drew on key analytical categories of Marxism, 
including in defining the subaltern in class terms. At the same time, Guha, 
Chakrabarty, Spivak and Chatterjee claim that the transition to mature capitalism is 
incomplete in India, and so produces different kinds of political subjectivity than that 
of the working class in contexts of completed transitions such as Europe. This is the 
basis for PS claims of political-economic difference and alterity of India, and of a 
different „history of power‟ in India: a polity in which liberalism (in the form of 
citizenship, civil society, secularism etc.) is not universal, the bourgeoisie is not 
hegemonic, and the working class is not fully proletarianised.  
 
Kevin Anderson (2010) challenges both PS and hegemonic Marxist understanding of 
what „Marxist political economy‟ says about India, suggesting a move in Marx‟s 
writings from an early position in which European experiences with capitalist 
modernity are replicated worldwide to a later one insisting on alterity of places 
outside the western European core, specifically including India,
 
because outside of 
this region, the preconditions were too different (Anderson, 2010: 20). One reason 
was, Marx notes in Grundrisse, the persistence of communal forms of social 
organization including labour and use of land and other resources, which are not 
easily individualized. Elsewhere Marx noted that in 19
th
 century India there was no 
„capitalist mode of production‟ as such, but rather “an historical impasse as the old 
 forms have disintegrated without progressive new ones being able to …. develop” 
(Anderson, 2010: 165). Even in the textile sector where British policy undermined 
traditional producers, “the British „work of dissolution‟ was proceeding very 
„gradually‟” (Anderson, 2010: 167). In his Critique of Political Economy, “Marx had 
written that Asian societies such as India needed to be analysed separately since their 
histories did not fit into the stages of development that he had worked out earlier on 
the basis of European history” (Anderson, 2010: 180). The move from primitive to 
capitalist accumulation proper needed preconditions that Marx did not see in India: 
deepening of mechanical industry, the domination of internal trade by foreign trade, 
and fuller incorporation into world markets (Anderson, 2010: 188).  
 
In light of Anderson‟s close reading, it becomes difficult to sustain positions such as 
Chibber‟s that Marx suggested a sort of „universalisation‟ of the rule of capital via 
reference to its „internal dynamism‟, that universalization only means the compulsion 
of capitalists to compete and workers to sell their labour, or this became generalized 
as a corollary of „market dependence‟, or that „market dependence‟ is an already 
universalized reality. There are questions of timing and process: if, as Marx suggests, 
the conditions for capitalist accumulation proper did not exist at the time of his 
writing, and nothing like „universalisation‟ had happened to any sufficient degree, 
then when exactly, if at all, can one say these conditions did become determining? 
When and how did the difference Marx notes between India and Europe cease to 
matter?  
 
Marx‟s distinction between Europe and India on the conditions for capitalist 
development and the universalization of capitalism‟s essential principles provides the 
 grounds for a materialist account of postcolonial difference. I suggest that the 
universalisation process is politically driven and faces political challenges. 
Universalisation is a class process, in at least four ways. It requires, first, the 
emergence of classes, capitalists and workers, who will be compelled to behave in the 
„universal‟ ways that Chibber outlines.4 Second, in the competition among capitalists 
the fraction that favours the deepening of the preconditions (Chibber himself shows 
that not all fractions of capital want this, see Chibber, 2006) outlined above must 
emerge victorious. Third, in the competition between classes, capitalists supporting 
universalization must emerge dominant. And fourth, the „communal‟ peasantry must 
dissolve adequately into „free‟ wage labour or lose political power (including that 
which resulted from their alterity) and thus the capacity to adequately resist the 
universalization process. Did the balance of class and social forces in India, and of 
transnational flows and forces as instantiated in India, facilitate these conditions?  
 
It would be difficult to make the case that competition-favouring fractions of capital 
have come to dominate the Indian capitalist class. During the late colonial period, 
while industrial activity rose, doubling between 1923 and 1947, Indian capitalists did 
not acquire class power to create the conditions for „proper‟ accumulation. 
Capitalism‟s „pure form‟ existed at a scale lower than what Marx describes for 
Western Europe at the same time.
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 As Tyabji (2015: 98) notes, quoting Levkovsky 
(1966), unlike in Britain from where the factory as an organizational form was 
imported to India, and where it “embodied concentrations of industrial capital”, in 
India factory owners continued moneylending and trade along with manufacturing, 
increased moneylending during the Depression, and maintained connections with 
rural moneylending: “the factory form merely cloaked concentrations of merchant and 
 usurer capital”. In the postcolonial period, state-owned enterprises, which also 
received funds and technical inputs substantially via international development flows, 
came to dominate many key sectors, such as banks, mining, energy, steel, 
infrastructure, railways etc., run on rationales (set out in the Industry Policy 
Resolutions of 1948 and 1956) that were not only economic but also „political‟ (e.g. 
employment, regional equity, national security, self-sufficiency), and accounted 
accounted for a substantial percentage of GDP, output and employment (Jain et al., 
2014). The public sector enterprises developed under Cold War conditions, in which 
India, by taking a „non-aligned‟ position independent of both the US and USSR, 
hoped to receive aid from their blocs. The private sector was subjected to the „license-
permit‟ raj with administrative coercion, heavy regulation and taxation. Foreign 
investment in the private sector was discouraged. Many enterprises were 
„nationalised‟ in the late 1960s and 1970s as Indira Gandhi attacked capitalists for 
bankrolling her opponents.  
 
The sluggish development of capitalism in India from 1947-1970 is attributed by 
Chatterjee‟s (1996) to the „passive revolution‟, in which the votaries of rapid capitalist 
development within the ruling coalition were not dominant. There was 
accommodation and tussle within the ruling coalition, with different constituents 
dominating at one time or another, and on one issue or another. Whether one takes 
Chatterjee‟s argument that capitalists lacked sufficient power to push through the 
agenda of rapid capitalist development or agree with Chibber (2006) that they had 
power which they used to orient the state towards protection, the result is the same: 
the postponement of the conditions of some sort of maturity, in which the 
universalization of the capitalism‟s core compulsions held sway.  
  
From the limited sales of public sector assets by Indira Gandhi‟s government in 1981 
to the full-blown „liberalisation‟ of the economy from the 1990s to the present, the 
scope of the private sector, and of foreign direct investment has expanded 
tremendously. This is a result both of the impositions by the World Bank and the 
IMF, or the US and its allies who triumphed in the Cold War, but also a result of 
changes in the preferences and aspirations of Indian capitalists. These changes form 
the conditions favouring increasing corporate profits and expansion of the private 
sector, but compulsive competition is still held at bay by state measures, such as loan 
write-offs and subsidies to business.
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 Both Indian capitalists individually, and 
organized fractions of capital, depend upon political contacts to buffer them against 
domestic and international economic and political risks. Arguably, it is in this way 
that Indian capitalism is universal, rather than in being subject to compulsive 
competition. 
 
Since industrialization was limited until the end of colonialism, so was the emergence 
of the „paradigmatic‟ working class. Rural community attenuated, but 
proletarianisation did not happen at the scale or with the completeness of Western 
Europe; the exodus of the poor to the cities seen in the west occurred to a more 
limited degree, despite the colonial state‟s lack of action to provide succor to victims 
of regular famines. For the immediately postcolonial period, planned state 
interventions in the economy aimed to ease „the rigours of transition‟ for the rural 
poor and to take a gradualist approach to a transition to capitalist agriculture. As the 
„mode of production‟ debates of the 1970s and 1980s establish, capitalist relations in 
 agriculture had become widespread, though as Lerche (2013) notes, this tendency 
shows wide regional variation. 
 
India agriculture, too, displays evidence of a blocked transition, in that the shift from 
a rural, agrarian society to an urban industrial one has reached an impasse. Small 
farms persist, with 70% the rural population (50% of the national population) seeking 
livelihoods from them. Food productivity, incomes, and share of GDP are down. 
Precarity is high, with substantial crop losses caused by unseasonal rain, too much or 
too little rain. Indebtedness too is high, and both crop failure and bumper crops affect 
farmers adversely.
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 There is accelerated conversion of farmland into non-agricultural 
purposes, including industry, infrastructure, housing development, special economic 
zones and economic processing zones, sports venues, etc. Farmers‟ distress is seen in 
the high number of suicides, estimated at 200,000 incidences between 1995-2006 
(Nagaraj, 2008: 3), and close to 300,000 between 1995-2014 by Sainath (2014).
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Unlike classical trajectories of primitive accumulation, Bernstein‟s (2005) general 
point that contemporary capitalist development proceeds without the resolution of the 
agrarian questions, because national industrialization now no longer needs capital 
released from agriculture domestically, and industry cannot absorb the countryside‟s 
„surplus‟ population – nor does it need to - is applicable to India. It is difficult for the 
peasantry either to stay in agriculture or to move to industrial work. As Gupta (2015: 
38) notes, “labour is ready to be hired for a song” but does not always find a buyer. 
Those who migrate to cities to work in industry or in services are not fully 
proletarianized, but maintain live links with the countryside, and exist in a sustained 
state of liminality between „peasant‟ and „worker‟ categories: venturing into non-
 agricultural work while still maintaining one foot in agrarian production relations. 
This availability of cheap labour depresses wages and has resulted in a manufacturing 
„boom‟ in small towns, and rural-to-rural migration. 
 
D‟Costa (2014) describes India‟s current growth phase as „compressed capitalism‟ in 
which “phases of capitalism do not follow each other in sequential order”, rather 
“advanced accumulation” by the corporate sector, including “innovation-led 
economic expansion” (D‟Costa, 2014: 319) coexists with primitive accumulation, 
resulting in “a massive lag in agricultural transition but a highly speeded up process 
of industrialization and growth in services” (D‟Costa, 2014: 324). Technological 
complexity and the availability of foreign direct investment allows leapfrogging over 
„stages‟ previously seen as necessary, so there is no mass employment as in the 
classic trajectories, nor generalized income growth, but rather “the mobilization of 
vast numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers in …. the informal sector 
in India” with low wages (D‟Costa, 2014: 321-2). Forms of petty commodity 
production persist, contracted to producers in the formal sector (D‟Costa, 2014: 332). 
Compressed capitalism also encourages consolidation of landlord class power rather 
than its liquidation. On the one hand, as Maoists argue (as per Lerche, 2013), they 
form part of the social coalition, with usurers, merchants, religious institutions, and 
local officials dominating the countryside, and as such play prominent roles as 
landlords in local and regional politics. On the other, they invest in real estate and 
other „modern‟ sectors.  
 
Sanyal (2007) suggests another reason why the transition in India, unlike in the earlier 
trajectories, is not complete: because programmes undertaken by governments, NGOs 
 and international development agencies to mitigate the rigours of transition for 
peasants and the poor maintain them in this liminal space. For him petty commodity 
production does not signify the universalisation of capitalism, but a hybrid form, 
exhibiting features of pre-, non- and more recognizably capitalist elements signaling 
not so much a transition to capitalism as the sustained distress of the subjects of 
transition. Development assistance provides life to this form via microfinance, 
livelihoods or other income-increasing schemes targeting particular commodities. 
Both capital accumulation and its legitimation via development programs today 
happen on a world scale, and the rights of the dispossessed who cannot be 
incorporated by compressed capitalism are integral to such programs.  
 
Development interventions and rights discourses that aim to protect and enhance 
livelihoods and incomes present a potential barrier to primitive accumulation, but 
contrary to Sanyal‟s (2007) and Chatterjee‟s (2008) suggestion, I argue these 
measures fall well short of a „reversal‟ of capitalist development. Programs of 
mitigation, such as the public food distribution scheme, the rural employment 
guarantee, etc., are themselves sites of predatory accumulation by politicians, public 
officials, and criminals. However, social movements, including armed rebellion by 
those resisting dispossession of the commons and other means of livelihoods, with 
involvement of Maoist revolutionaries, strong support from „progressive‟ elements of 
the bourgeoisie, and transnational solidarity channeled via powerful groups like 
Greenpeace, have succeeded in exceptional cases to stall projects. For the most part, 
however, projects that will cause dispossession and displacement are common: since 
2005 more than 1000 projects have been approved, despite government agencies 
 warning of risk of violent opposition to the growth model (Government of India, 
2008).  
 
In this section, I have shown that the debate on whether Indian capitalism is 
particular, or just an iteration of the „universalization of particular strategies‟, 
erroneously posits „culture‟ against „political economy‟, when „political economy‟ 
itself provides grounds for arguing for considerable difference between the Indian 
experience compared to the paradigmatic trajectories of capitalist transition: from 
Marx‟s emphasis on Indian difference, to Chatterjee‟s and Chibber‟s account of the 
power of Indian capitalists to slow down an accelerated transition, to agrarian 
Marxists‟ contention that bypassing the resolution of the agrarian questions of capital 
and labour characterizes contemporary capitalism. Supposedly transitional forms such 
as the peasantry, petty commodity production and landlord power persist rather than 
disappear, partly because in a democracy political compulsions emanating from 
universal suffrage, and legitimation of global capitalism via international 
development programs and the rights agenda, prevent primitive accumulation from 
reaching its „logical‟ conclusion. What are the implications of these differences for  
„histories of power‟, particularly as revealed in the new ruling coalition assembled by 
the current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi? 
 
Histories of Power and the Modi moment 
 
For PS approaches, „histories of power‟ in India differ from Europe in that a) the 
Indian bourgeoisie was unable to create a hegemony of liberal capitalism; b) that 
nothing like the paradigmatic working class emerged in India; c) the politics of most 
 of the population remains autonomous from modern-liberal logics and institutional 
practices; and d) as a result political demands are not made in the language of 
universal rights but as exceptions. Marxists rebut these claims, arguing that the 
European bourgeoisie was rapacious and coercive in its relation with labour, and was 
thus never hegemonic. They urge a restoration of „class analysis‟ (rather than, say, 
giving indigeneity, caste or community analytical primacy as PS scholars do) as the 
main explanatory lens, and endorse politics of workers based on rational and universal 
principles of solidarity, pursued under the leadership of a mass political party. This 
assumes that a working class already exists, ignoring Ambedkar‟s idea that caste is 
not only a division of labour but a division of labourers (see Teltumbde, 2010). Some 
questions to ask, therefore, are: What is „hegemony‟ in the Indian political field and 
does the power of the „Indian bourgeoisie‟ approximate  it? What role if any do 
subalterns have in its constitution? What are the modes of establishing hegemony 
within the Indian political field, and what challenges? And do canonical Marxist or 
PS accounts adequately explain the politics of the bourgeoisie and of workers and 
peasants?
9
  
 
Note that both perspectives a) suggest coercion as the opposite of hegemony; b) take 
hegemony as a form of power operating exclusively in national spaces and c) agree 
that the Indian bourgeoisie was not hegemonic. For Gramsci, hegemony involved 
some combination of coercion, corruption and consent; domination describes a 
situation in which power is exercised without needing the active consent of the ruled. 
To elicit consent, ruling classes accommodate some interests of subordinate classes in 
agendas of rule. Contrary to the claims of PS approaches and their Marxist critics, in 
the Indian bourgeoisie did exercise hegemony, and not merely domination, with 
 considerable stability, from the 1930s to the mid-1960s.
10
 This is indicated by the 
(admittedly unequal) incorporation of the ruled into structures of rule, and by their 
relative political quiescence. While the temporal limits of the „postcolonial‟ are rarely 
specified, extending from decolonization to now, I suggest that postcolonial 
developmentalism (known also as Nehruvian socialism) began to break down from 
the mid-1970s. Since the 1980s, a new bourgeoisie has emerged as the champion of 
rapid capitalist development, replacing the postcolonial bourgeoisie, and new 
categories of workers have emerged that are different from both the PS and Marxist 
accounts. Both require a new account of „hegemony‟. 
 
The „bourgeoisie‟ is a more capacious term, in Marx, Engels and Lenin‟s account and 
in popular usage, than merely „capitalists‟ as in the narrow usage by Marxists such as 
Chibber. It includes „owners of means of production‟ and „employers of labour‟, but 
also higher-level employees of capitalists, rentiers, the intelligentsia, upper level civil 
servants and military officials and the like. It also includes part of the „middle classes‟ 
whose lower half belongs to the „petty bourgeoisie‟. This bourgeoisie was arguably 
hegemonic until the early 1970s, but its hegemony eroded from the late-1960s, 
signaled by the emergence of the Maoist movement and the massive state repression 
unleashed on it, and by a range of new movements against the growth model, 
corruption and persistent caste oppression. By the time of the imposition of the 
national emergency in 1975, coercion trumped active consent as the core component 
of hegemony, indeed the imposition of the Emergency was the substitution of 
hegemony by domination. I have suggested elsewhere (Sinha, 2015) that the 
bourgeoisie has now bifurcated. The „old‟ bourgeoisie has lost state power: it now 
exists as „civil society‟ defenders of the pillars of an idealized Nehruvian socialism in 
 a debate that they have now lost, and appear as „progressive‟ allies of victims of rapid 
growth, or growing communalization, while the new bourgeoisie has emerged as the 
champions of rapid growth and opponents of programs to mitigate its social and 
environmental costs. 
 
D‟Costa suggests „mature capitalism‟ began to take roots in India from the 1990s, 
following “state intervention in alliance with and in favor of a nascent capitalist class” 
(2014: 326), whose preference for rapid growth, privatization, market reforms, 
deregulation, discourses equating state sectors with corruption and inefficiency, need 
to reduce subsidies, etc., watchwords common to the neoliberal revolution worldwide, 
have become salient in India. The state brokered and activated relations between 
national and transnational capital (via facilitating FDI and joint ventures), between 
„public‟ and „private‟ sectors (via public-private partnerships), and shifted public 
assets to private ownership (via auction of public holdings in industry, mining, land, 
etc.). These changes were ushered in by the Congress-party led coalitions and 
deepened by BJP-led ones, with the former retaining a component of welfarism and 
the latter seeing growth as a substitute for welfare. Currently a key desiderata of 
„good governance‟ is to „improve the ease of doing business‟. This established what 
Chatterjee (2008) calls the „hegemony of corporate capital‟, including new fractions 
of capitalists, and an entire generation of middle classes and aspirational middle 
classes opposed to state regulation of the economy. Their clearest political expression 
came with the popular electoral mandate – active consent - for the Modi government. 
How has the universalisation of capital fared as a political project given that a 
stronger coalition in support of it exists today than at anytime in the past? 
 
 The slowdown in approvals of  projects by the previous UPA government, and its turn 
towards „inclusive neoliberalism‟ with policies to mitigate the effects of 
dispossession, displacement and immiseration, generated the charges of „policy 
paralysis‟ and corruption by the BJP under Modi‟s leadership, becoming the central 
plank of its successful election campaign. Modi focused on the inability of the 
Congress-led governments to complete the transition to mature capitalism, and 
offered an agenda of large-scale privatization, deepening of markets, further 
deregulation, making the state more business-friendly, eliminating corruption, cutting 
subsidies, enhancing manufacture, unleashing the IT sector, massive infrastructure 
construction, making land acquisition and land use more friendly to capital, and 
removal of social and environmental constraints to these objectives. Modi lampooned 
previous attempts at poverty elimination and presented rapid capitalist development 
as the only way to end poverty and social deprivation. He received unreserved support 
from all fractions of Indian and transnational capital, from the „neo middle class‟, 
from youth and from rich farmers.
11
 Some prominent dalit intellectuals and politicians 
too supported this agenda.
12
 His support cut across class and caste, breaking and 
drawing fragments that were previously consolidated into other units of political 
mobilization, though it thinned out down the income scale.  
 
While Modi‟s agenda is for accelerated growth and the expansion of the sovereignty 
of capital, whether it will universalise the compulsion to compete that Chibber sees as 
central to capitalism is more ambiguous. During his frequent international trips Modi 
has pushed for opportunities for Indian capitalists and certain business houses 
particularly, including facilitating joint ventures in sectors like Defence which had 
been near-monopolies of the public sector, while at the same cushioning these houses 
 from the forces of raw competition, via massive public lands giveaways, mammoth 
subsidies and tax breaks, or overlooking huge tax arrears (NDTV, 2015). Another 
component of the bourgeoisie, the traders, shopkeepers and merchants, has opposed 
the opening up of their sectors to foreign players. 
 
Modi‟s policies to compel workers to sell their labour are more forthright. Contrary to 
Lerche‟s (2013) suggestion that the non-agrarian Indian bourgeoisie does not seem to 
need to press for a solution to the agrarian question in the classical sense, this social 
coalition is in fact looking to resolve the agrarian question, via its vocal support for an 
aggressive land acquisition law that removes social and environmental checks, and its 
opposition to rural employment guarantee, the right to food, and to subsidies 
generally.
13
 Hostility to anti-poverty programs that, for Sanyal, reverse or at least 
mitigate the effects of compressed capitalism, is evident in ridiculing the poor and the 
„critiques of povertarianism‟ made by intellectuals of this class.14 Despite campaign 
promises, output support prices to farmers have not been hiked, and compensation for 
weather related crop losses is low. Farmer suicides, continuing unabated, are publicly 
mocked by ministers. So-called labour reforms make hiring and firing of workers 
easier and collective action more difficult, and replace state monitoring and 
sanctioning of employers with self-reporting and self-policing. The conversion of 
agricultural land to industrial, real-estate, infrastructure, sport and commercial uses 
aims to produce new informal workers, whose low wages and minimally regulated 
working conditions will fuel Modi‟s „Make in India‟ project. 
 
Establishing the pre-conditions of market dependence involves violence and coercion 
directed towards those who will oppose it. As for India‟s Maoists who claim to act on 
 behalf of tribals, the rural poor and informal workers, Modi promises a „fight to the 
finish‟ and supports heavy police action, for which he has significant consent of his 
electoral base and beyond. However, despite having a clear electoral mandate for his 
platform, Modi is unable to holding together the coalition for capitalist growth, and 
simultaneously to maintain coherence to the narrative that he is acting on behalf of, 
and for the benefit of, the poor. Declaring opponents of his agenda to be threats to 
„national economic security‟ and part of a global conspiracy to keep India down, he 
has clamped down on „civil society‟ and social movement activists. But Modi 
politically cannot afford to be seen as anti-poor (see Singh, 2015). The continued 
agrarian crisis, exacerbated by weather events, has made it difficult to cut subsidies 
and programs of mitigating primitive accumulation‟s effect on the rural poor. 
Farmers‟ groups, including those affiliated with his party, are opposed to dilutions to 
the land acquisition provisions, as are labour groups to his „labour reform‟ proposals. 
Indeed Modi‟s 2016-17 Budget is seen as favouring distressed farmers over market 
reforms (Hotta, 2016). 
 
Modi‟s agenda for rapid transition to mature capitalism faces dilemmas posed by 
D‟Costa‟s „compression‟. Marx, in Capital I (1967: 507), had noted that in England 
by the 19th century, “the very memory of the connexion between the agricultural 
labourer and the communal property had …. vanished.” In contrast to this amnesia 
regarding the brutal process of primitive accumulation, that dissolved the peasantry 
and created the proletariat, India‟s new working class, recent and partial-migrants to 
cities, maintains live links with the countryside, and its political subjectivity is also 
constituted by agrarian issues, and issues of migration. Historically oppressed castes 
dominate economic categories like small-holders, share-croppers and landless 
 workers, and are formed into political constituencies such as „extremely backward 
castes‟. The persistence of petty commodity production, which in India is caste and 
religious-community coded (in the sense that certain castes and religious communities 
dominate the production of particular commodities), implies a good „political 
economy‟ rather than „cultural‟ reason for the continued political salience of caste. 
These subjectivities, rather than that of pure „worker‟, emerge in a context in which 
movements for rights to nature, rights for dalits and women, rights to food, 
employment, and education, and for civil liberties, an equitable development model, 
regional identity and autonomy, are sedimented features of the political terrain. 
Primitive accumulation cannot be taken to its „logical‟ conclusion when its immediate 
victims have rights, institutionalized means of claim making, social movements and 
solidarity networks.  
 
The „cultural difference‟ of the victims of primitive accumulation, articulated in the 
language of rights and based on provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution, poses a continuing barrier to that process: witness the „victories‟, 
admittedly contingent and unstable, of Kondh tribals in relation to POSCO, or of SEZ 
cancellations in Bengal and elsewhere. While Modi had castigated the UPA for delays 
in clearing mining projects, his ministry was forced within a year to notify state 
government to respect tribal rights and concerns and constitutional provisions in 
awarding contracts (Patel, 2015). 
 
Even when the coalition for capital has „hegemonic‟ power in the form of active 
consent of and enthusiastic enrolment by a decisive swathe of the population, Modi 
still needs „culture‟ to suture „nationalism‟ to „capitalism‟, for example via seemingly 
 bland slogans like „India First‟ and overt appeals to Hindu nationalism. But hegemony 
in India today is not what it used to be. Its politics, while still primarily played out in 
India, now has overt transnational connections, whether in terms of capital flows, or 
in terms of monitoring and evaluations by international development agencies and 
investment banks and consultancies, or in relation of networks of solidarity with those 
resisting primitive accumulation.
15
 Also it lacks the stability and longevity that is 
normally attributed to it, and the discourses and mechanisms for the enrolment of 
support provide both openings for counter-mobilizations as well as „languages of 
contention‟ (Roseberry, 1994). Instead of the stripped-to-the-bones environment of 
„compulsive behaviour‟, the agenda is moored in the stated objective of eradicating 
poverty in record time, which provides grounds for assessment and critique of rule. 
Modi, while unapologetically pro-capitalist and with close relation to domestic and 
transnational capitalists, has been „pro-business‟ but has also been careful not to 
appear too „pro-market‟ or „pro-competition‟. Indeed, he is now recognized not to 
believe in free-market capitalism (Bandow, 2015). Thus generalized market 
dependence that would cause universalisation of compulsion-oriented behaviour 
continues to be held in a sustained state of deferral. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I asked whether Indian capitalism, and the political behaviour of social 
groups in relation to it, were sufficiently different from those western Europe to 
warrant the qualifier „postcolonial‟, how the process of the universalization of 
capitalism‟s „essential elements‟ as outlined by Chibber over this terrain of difference 
has fared, and how these have affected the conditions for the emergence of new forms 
 of political subjectivity. I attempted to move the debate away from its framing as 
„culture/particularity vs political economy/universalism‟, in which both sides make 
exaggerated and empirically unsustainable claims for culture and political economy. 
If the former does not see how „culture‟ transforms over time, in part responding to 
the encounter with „Western modernity‟, the latter provides no account of the process 
of universalization, the challenges it faces and the mutations that occur as a result of 
these challenges. My attempt as been to present the „universalisation‟ of capitalism‟s 
„core principles‟ as a process determined by political - including class – struggles, and 
as an open-ended, indeterminate process in contemporary India. 
 
The universalisation of behaviour of capitalists and workers responding to „the dull 
compulsion of economic force‟ implies the completion of a transition to something 
resembling mature capitalism: a condition of generalized commodity production, in 
which the imperative of accumulation drives capitalists‟ behaviour, and where labour 
becomes a commodity (Bernstein, 2010: 25-27).  In places like India today not only is 
this process not „complete‟, but as Sanyal (2007) suggests, it is never likely to be: 
capitalism will be in a constant state of „becoming‟, never reaching the state of 
„being‟. That deferral of completeness of the transition is the central point of 
difference between capitalism in India and in the original trajectories of the European 
core.  
 
For Marx the universalization of capital involved violent subjugation and annihilation 
of non-capitalist ways of life, as Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015) remind us. But 
because the victims of primitive accumulation are subjects of rights and protagonists 
in powerful movements (and not only because „capital does not need the resolution of 
 agrarian questions‟ as per Bernstein), in India the annihilation of non-capitalist ways 
of life – including hybrid production relations - and categories is necessarily 
incomplete, and are kept alive by development interventions to benefit those who are 
excluded from capitalist relations but have some political power in the form of laws 
and justice and solidarity discourses that firm up non-capitalist forms of subjectivity, 
and put limits to the violence of the universalization process on extra-economic 
grounds. Caste, gender, tribe and region remain inextricable from the category of 
labour, and from class identities, rather than separated from it, and are points for the 
emergence of political subjectivity in addition to – sometimes as alternative to - that 
of the „working class‟. An argument for an extension of class analysis and a class-
based universal solidarity must take into account these non-economic – though still 
„rational‟ - forms of subjectivity: a „pure‟ class consciousness of workers and peasant 
might emerge at specific moments, but a permanent and stable subjectivity of the 
„working class‟ of earlier, more successful transition contexts, is not possible. Culture 
is key to the constitution of political subjects opposed to the universalisation of capital 
and in the politics of solidarity, not an optional add-on. This is a more complex task 
than building solidarity on some woolly notion of „basic human needs‟ as Chibber 
(2013) suggests: „dignity‟ and „recognition‟ figure as important goals of subaltern 
movements, not only wages. It is in that sense that we need to approach the issue of 
„histories of power‟. 
What is universalized today is not only aspects of the experience of early capitalist 
transitions but also certain features of postcolonial capitalism: informalization and 
precarity of work is widespread in capitalism‟s original homelands, „cultural‟ 
elements such as nationalism, ethno-centrism and populism return as key elements of 
the politics of the working class, and the long term decline of the paradigmatic 
 organisations of workers signals that the conditions of the postcolony now define core 
relations in the metropolitan centres. We therefore need to think of „universalization‟ 
not as a diffusion of core principles radiating from the centre, but as dynamics with 
multiple points of origin creating a shifting, changing universe. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 Except, tangentially, in Chaudhary 1987. 
2
 This is exemplified in the writings of Rajiv Malhotra, who draws on Edward Said, 
Frantz Fanon, Ranajit Guha, Ashis Nandy and Enrique Dussel, among others.  
3
 This critique is also made in Knafo and Teschke (2015), footnote 9. 
4
 In fact one could say that different compulsions are constitutive of class position and 
structure. 
5
 See Birla (2009) for an account of the attempt by colonial authorities to create the 
preconditions for the spread of capitalism‟s core principles, and the compromises 
made with community and with the realities of colonial rule. Simeon (2014) points 
out that the other compulsions were at play in colonial conditions: the Tatas were 
compelled to work for the colonial state, which cushioned it from the sort of 
compulsion Chibber has in mind.  
                                                                                                                                                               
6
 Sainath (2014b) mentions a figure of Rs 36.5 trillion in customs duties, taxes and 
bad loans written off between 2005-6 to 2013-14. Mallet and Crabtree (2015) estimate 
that 14% of public sector bank assets are „bad assets and doubtful loans‟.  
7
 See Kar‟s (2015) report on the suicides by potato farmers in Bengal when bumper 
crops pushed prices down to half their normal level, rendering them unable to repay 
their loans. 
8
 Arvind Panagariya, now Economic Advisor to the Modi government, estimated that 
close 40% of these suicides were due to reasons connected with agriculture. (2008: 
153) This is considered a low figure.  
9
 Whether liberal capitalism was never  „hegemonic‟ in Europe, even in the Golden 
Age of the Keynsian National Welfare State, an important question, is outside of the 
scope of this paper. See Overbeek and van der Pijl (1993) for a fuller consideration of 
the end of this hegemonic project in Western Europe.  
10
 A Maoist intellectual, „VV‟, tells Sudeep Chakravarti (2008: 230), “In Nehru‟s 
time, from independence to 1964, there was an illusion of welfare state. During his 
daughter Indira‟s time there was the illusion of Garibi Hatao. Even the state…is not 
claiming to be a welfare state anymore.” 
11
 The „neo-middle class‟ referred to Modi in his speeches and in the BJP manifesto 
are newly urban or from so-called „tier-2‟ and „tier 3 cities‟, are aggressively 
aspirational, hyper-nationalist and are overwhelmingly involved in non-state sector 
employment. Some of these attributes are also recognized in Jaffrelot (2013: 83-84). 
12
 In the words of prominent pro-capitalist Dalit intellectual Chandrabhan Prasad, 
“capitalism is changing caste much faster than any human being. Therefore, in 
capitalism versus caste, there is a battle going on and Dalits should look at capitalism 
as a crusader against caste.” http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/capitalism-is-
changing-caste-much-faster-than-any-human-being.-dalits-should-look-at-capitalism-
as-a-crusader-against-caste/1127570/0. (Consulted September 14 2014). D Shyam 
Babu, a senior fellow at New Delhi‟s Centre for Policy Research, a New Delhi think-
tank, argues that Dalits‟ political preferences have moved from human rights 
violations, land reforms and other social issues, to the need for entrepreneurial 
opportunities, occupational diversity and mobility. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/report/ls-election-caste-or-progress-what-young-dalit-
voters-want/20140425.htm (Consulted September 15 2014). Neither of them endorsed 
Modi‟s campaign. 
13
 They suggest, for example, the removal of the „consent clause‟ in the Forest Rights 
Act which requires permission of right-holding communities before  forested land is 
converted for mining or other extractive or developmental purpose. See 
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/fe-columnist/righting-forest-rights/111217/  
14
 I have in mind Gurcharan Das, Shekhar Gupta, Surjit Bhalla and Tavleen Singh 
who are are prominent columnists for the the major newspapers and regular 
commentators on Indian television news programs. 
15
 Witness the Modi‟s government‟s moves to change the calculation of the growth 
rate to attract FDI, and the claims of its supporters that India‟s rank as the top 
destination of FDI legitimizes his rule. These figures are questioned by international 
development agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. Indian ruling coalitions 
take seriously the credit ratings given to India by Moody‟s and Standard and Poor. 
Aware of the potential of transnational solidarity networks in disrupting the growth 
plans, the Modi government has banned 13,000 NGOs, including prominent 
transnational ones such as Greenpeace. 
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